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ABSTRACT
We compare the expected efficiency of revenue maximizing
(or optimal) mechanisms with that of efficiency maximizing
ones. We show that the efficiency of the revenue maximizing
mechanism for selling a single item with (k + log e
e−1
k + 1)
bidders is at least as much as the efficiency of the efficiency
maximizing mechanism with k bidders, when bidder valua-
tions are drawn i.i.d. from a Monotone Hazard Rate distri-
bution. Surprisingly, we also show that this bound is tight
within a small additive constant of 5.7. In other words,
Θ(log k) extra bidders suffice for the revenue maximizing
mechanism to match the efficiency of the efficiency maxi-
mizing mechanism, while o(log k) do not. This is in contrast
to the result of Bulow and Klemperer [1] comparing the rev-
enue of the two mechanisms, where only one extra bidder
suffices. More precisely, they show that the revenue of the
efficiency maximizing mechanism with k + 1 bidders is no
less than the revenue of the revenue maximizing mechanism
with k bidders.
We extend our result for the case of selling t identical
items and show that 2.2 log k + tΘ(log log k) extra bidders
suffice for the revenue maximizing mechanism to match the
efficiency of the efficiency maximizing mechanism.
In order to prove our results, we do a classification of
Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions and identify a
family of MHR distributions, such that for each class in our
classification, there is a member of this family that is point-
wise lower than every distribution in that class. This lets
us prove interesting structural theorems about distributions
with Monotone Hazard Rate.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.m [Theory of Computation]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Design, Economics, Theory
Keywords
Auction Design, Efficiency, VCG, Optimal Auctions
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions are bid-based mechanisms for buying and selling
of goods. The two most common objective functions in auc-
tion design are efficiency and revenue. Efficiency is the sum
∗work done while the author was visiting Google Inc.
of the surplus of both the seller and the buyer, which repre-
sents the total social welfare, whereas revenue is the surplus
of the seller only. The efficiency and revenue of auctions has
been the subject of extensive study in auction theory (see,
e.g., the survey [9], and the citations within). Ideally we
would like to simultaneously maximize both the objective
functions. But these two goals cannot be achieved simul-
taneously. Thus, we have the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism [8, 2, 3] which is a truthful mech-
anism that maximizes efficiency on the one hand, and My-
erson’s Optimal Mechanism [5] that maximizes revenue on
the other. If one is interested in both objective functions,
then one has to trade-off the two. The exact balance of how
much weight to give to each objective is, perhaps, a difficult
question in any real-world setting. Generally, private sell-
ers would like to maximize revenue, but keeping long-term
benefit of the business in mind, they might want to keep
social welfare high as well. Similarly, the primary goal in
allocating public goods is to maximize social welfare, but a
secondary objective might be to raise revenue.
In the light of this dilemma, a natural question that arises
is: how sub-optimal is the revenue of the VCG mechanism,
and how sub-optimal is the efficiency of Myerson’s Opti-
mal Mechanism. Bulow and Klemperer [1] give a structural
theorem which characterizes the sub-optimality of the rev-
enue of the VCG mechanism. They show that for the case
of selling a single item, the VCG mechanism with one ex-
tra bidder makes at least as much revenue in expectation
as the expected revenue of Myerson’s Optimal mechanism
(when bidder valuations are drawn from a class of distribu-
tions called regular distributions). A seller, who is currently
using the VCG mechanism and wishes to increase her rev-
enue, faces two choices: (1) increase the reserve price closer
to Myerson’s reserve price, or (2) attract more bidders by
investing in sales and marketing. Bulow and Klemperer’s
theorem gives an insight into the trade-offs between these
two choices.
In this paper, we characterize the sub-optimality of the
efficiency of Myerson’s Optimal mechanism. We show that,
surprisingly, there exists a class of distributions with mono-
tone hazard rate for which a constant number of extra bid-
ders does not suffice for Myerson’s optimal mechanism to
match the efficiency of the VCG mechanism. In fact, we
show that one needs at least ω(log k) extra bidders, where
k is the number of bidders participating in the VCG mech-
anism. We match this lower bound by showing that, for all
monotone hazard rate distributions, O(log k) extra bidders
always suffice (our upper and lower bounds are tight up to
a small additive constant). This contradicts the following
intuition: since the efficiency of Myerson’s Optimal mecha-
nism gets closer to the VCG mechanism as the number of
bidders k increases, we would expect the number of extra
bidders needed would go down as k increases. Another way
of interpreting our upper bound is that with O(log k) ex-
tra bidders, Myerson’s Optimal mechanism simultaneously
maximizes both revenue and efficiency. We extend our upper
bound result to the case of selling multiple identical items
as well.
In order to prove the above results, we do a classification
of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions and identify
a family of MHR distributions, such that for each class in
our classification, there is a member of this family that is
pointwise lower than every distribution in that class. This
enables us to prove certain important structural properties
of distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate, which helps us
prove our main theorems.
1.1 Model
Our model consists of a single seller and k buyers (bid-
ders). We will consider the case of selling a single item, and
also the case of selling t identical items when each bidder
has unit demand. The private values (vi)i∈[k] of the bidders
are drawn independently from a common distribution D.
Here vi represents the value of the bidder i for one unit of
the item. We will use fD and FD to denote the probability
density function and cumulative distribution function of the
distribution D respectively.
The hazard rate of a distribution D is given by hD(x)
:= fD(x)/(1 − FD(x)). A distribution D is said to have a
monotone hazard rate (MHR) if hD(.) is a non-decreasing
function of x. For the most part, we will assume (as is com-
mon in the economics literature) that the given distribution
D has a monotone hazard rate. Many common families of
distributions such as the Uniform and the Exponential fam-
ilies have MHR. We will assume that the support of D lies
between [0,∞). Also, for the ease of presenting main ideas,
we will assume that FD is a continuous function even though
the results hold in non-continuous case as well.
We will restrict our attention to truthful auctions, those
in which bidders have no incentive to misreport their true
valuation. Thus we can assume that the bidders bid their
true private values, i.e., the bid vector (bi)i∈[k] is same as
the value vector (vi)i∈[k]. From here onwards, we will use
the terms bid and value interchangeably.
For a given mechanism, its efficiency on a given input is
defined as the sum of the valuations of the bidders who get
the good, while its revenue is defined as sum of the payments
to the seller. Since the private values of bidders are not ar-
bitrary but rather drawn from a distribution, we will be
interested in the values of efficiency and revenue in expecta-
tion. We will use Eff(M) to denote the expected efficiency
of a mechanism M .
1.2 Optimal Auctions: Vickrey and Myerson
We will use Ema(k) to denote the efficiency maximizing
(VCG) auction with k bidders (D will always be clear from
context). It assigns the item to the highest bidder and
charges it the second highest bid. In the case of selling t
identical items, Ema(k) allocates the items to the t highest
bidders, charging each of them the t+ 1th highest bid.
Similarly, we will use Rma(k) to denote revenue maximiz-
ing auction (Myerson’s auction) with k bidders. Myerson [5]
defined a notion of virtual valuation ψi of a bidder i, where
ψi := vi −
1
hD(vi)
Myerson showed that the revenue maximizing truthful auc-
tion is the one which maximizes the virtual efficiency (sum
of the virtual valuations of the auction winners). Thus, in
the single item case, it assigns the item to the bidder with
the highest non-negative virtual value (and does not sell the
item if all virtual values are negative). If a distribution D
satisfies the regularity condition, defined as ψ(x) being a
non-decreasing function, then the above condition is equiv-
alent to assigning item to the highest bidder as long his
virtual value is non-negative (note that distributions with
MHR always satisfy the regularity condition). This cutoff
value at which ψ(x) = 0 is called the reserve price rD.
Definition 1 (Reserve price). Reserve price of dis-
tribution D is defined as:
rD := x, s.t. hD(x) = 1/x
We drop the subscript D, if D is clear from context. Thus
in the single item case with regular distributions, Rma(k)
assigns the item to the highest bidder, as long as its bid is no
smaller than the reserve price, and charges it the maximum
of the reserve price and the second highest bid (it does not
sell the item if all bids are below the reserve price). In the
case of selling t identical items, Rma(k) finds the k′ ≤ k
bidders whose bids are above the reserve price, allocates one
item each to the highest min{t, k′} bidders and charges each
one the maximum of the reserve price and the t+1th highest
bid.
1.3 Related Work
Bulow and Klemperer [1] characterized the revenue sub-
optimality of Ema. They showed that Ema(k + 1) (with
one extra bidder) has at least as much expected revenue
as Rma(k). Their result can be interpreted in a bi-criteria
sense; VCG auctions with one extra bidder simultaneously
maximize both revenue and efficiency. For the case of t iden-
tical items, they show that t additional bidders are needed
for the result to hold.
In [7], Roughgarden and Sundararajan gave the approx-
imation factor of the optimal revenue that is obtained by
Ema(k). They show that, for t identical items and k bid-
ders with unit demand, the revenue of Ema(k) is at least
(1 − t/k) times the revenue of Rma(k). Neeman [6] also
studied the percentage of revenue which Ema(k) makes com-
pared to Rma(k) in the single item case. [6] used a numeri-
cal analysis approach and assumed that the distribution D
is any general distribution (not restricted to regular or MHR
as in [7]) but with a bounded support.
In another related work looking at simultaneously opti-
mization of both revenue and efficiency, Likhodedov and
Sandholm [4] gave a mechanism which maximizes efficiency,
given a lower bound constraint on the total revenue.
1.4 Our Results
We study the number of extra bidders required for My-
erson’s (revenue-)optimal mechanism to achieve at least as
much efficiency as the efficiency maximizing (VCG) mecha-
nism. Let α = 1 − 1/e. For bidder valuations drawn from
a distribution with Monotone Hazard Rate, we prove the
following:
• Single item Upper Bound (Theorem 8): In the single
item case, m ≥
j
log 1
α
2k
k
+ 2 extra bidders suffice to
for the revenue maximizing mechanism to achieve at
least as much efficiency as the efficiency maximizing
mechanism with k bidders (for any k).
• Single item Lower Bound (Theorem 9): In the single
item case, we demonstrate a distribution having mono-
tone hazard rate, such that for any k, if the efficiency-
optimal mechanism has k bidders, and the revenue-
optimal mechanism hasj
log1/α (k + 1)(1− α)
k
+ 1 extra bidders, then the ef-
ficiency of the latter is strictly less than the efficiency
of the former. In other words,j
log1/α (k + 1)(1− α)
k
+1 extra bidders do not suffice.
• Multi item Upper Bound (Theorem 11): In the case
of selling t identical items, with bidders having unit-
demand: m + s extra bidders suffice for the revenue-
optimal mechanism to achieve at least as much effi-
ciency as the efficiency-optimal mechanism with k bid-
ders, where m =
j
log 1
α
2k
k
+ 2 and s ≥ t + (1 +
ǫ)t logm, for every ǫ > 0 and large enough k. Thus,
approximately, log k + t log log k extra bidders suffice.
• We also show that if both auctions have the same num-
ber of bidders k, then the ratio of the efficiency of the
revenue-optimal auction to the optimal efficiency is at
least 1− αk. (The proof is easy and we omit it in this
extended abstract1).
• We also prove (Section 5) that our upper bound result
does not hold for regular distributions – we show that
for every k,m, there is a regular distribution for which
the efficiency of the revenue-optimal mechanism with
k + m bidders is strictly lower than the efficiency of
the efficiency-optimal mechanism with k bidders.
Outline of the paper:
Section 2 describes some basic setup which is common to the
rest of the paper. Section 3 describes our results for the sin-
gle item case. We start with the definition of two quantities
Gain and Loss, and analyze the expression Gain−Loss in
Section 3.1. Section 3.2 and 3.3 prove our upper and lower
bound results respectively. In Section 4, we extend out up-
per bound result to the case of selling t indentical items to
bidders with unit-demand. Section 5 deals with the case of
regular distributions.
2. BASIC SETUP
To compare the two mechanismsRma(k+m) and Ema(k),
which have a different number of bidders, we will think of
the process of drawing their bidder values as drawing k+m
bidder values (b1, b2, ..bk+m) independently from the distri-
bution D – the first k bidders (b1, b2, ..bk) participate in both
1In fact we can also prove using the same techniques that
the ratio of the revenue of VCG to that of Myerson’s Opti-
mal Auction is 1−αk−1, which improves on the polynomial
bound provided in [7].
Rma(k +m) and Ema(k), whereas the last m bidders par-
ticipate only in Rma(k +m).
The following lemma will prove useful in the subsequent
sections.
Lemma 1. For any MHR distribution D: FD(r) ≤ 1−1/e,
where r is the reserve price for the distribution D.
Proof. Let the hazard rate of distribution D be h(x). By
definition of hazard rate, we have FD(x) = 1 − e
−
R
x
0 h(t)dt.
By definition of reserve price, h(r) = 1/r. Also since D has
MHR, we get h(x) ≤ 1/r, ∀x ≤ r. Thus,
∀x ≤ r : 1− e−
R
x
0 h(t)dt ≤ 1− e−
R
x
0 1/rdt
⇒ FD(r) ≤ 1− e
−
R
r
0 1/rdt
(setting x = r)
⇒ FD(r) ≤ 1− e
−1
3. SELLING ONE ITEM
We begin by noting that when selling a single item, if the
value of any of the first k bidders is greater than or equal to
the reserve price rD, then Rma(k +m) achieves at least as
much efficiency as Ema(k).
The more challenging case (for the upper bound) occurs
when the value drawn by all the first k bidders is less than
the reserve price. In this case, Ema(k) achieves an efficiency
equal to the highest value among the values of the first k
bidders, whereas the contribution of the first k bidders to
Rma(k +m) is zero as all of these bidders have a value less
than the reserve price cutoff. In other words, conditioned on
the event that first k bidders’ value is less than the reserve
price rD, the expected efficiency of Ema(k) is
R
r
0 xf
(k)(x)dx
F (k)(r)
,
where F
(k)
D and f
(k)
D are the c.d.f and p.d.f of the maximum of
k numbers picked i.i.d. from D (we will drop the subscriptD
whenever D is clear from the context). Note that F (k)(x) =
F k(x), and f (k)(x) = kF k−1(x)f(x). Also, conditioned on
this event, the expected contribution of the first k bidders
(b1, b2, ..., bk) to the efficiency of Rma(k + l) is zero. We
define:
LossD =
R r
0
xf
(k)
D (x)dx
F kD(r)
(1)
To make up for this lost efficiency, the revenue maximiz-
ing mechanism has m extra bidders. The contribution to
the expected efficiency of Rma(k +m) from these m extra
bidders (bk+1, bk+2, ..bk+m), conditioned on the event that
the value of bidders (b1, b2, ..bk) is less than rD, is at least
(1 − Fm(rD))rD. This is because of the fact that all the
draws are independent and the probability that at least one
of the m extra bidders will have a value higher than the
reserve price rD is (1− F
m(rD)). We define:
GainD = (1− F
m(rD))rD (2)
If for all distributions D, it is true that GainD−LossD ≥
0 for some k,m, then we know that the efficiency of Rma(k+
m) is at least as much as the efficiency of Ema(k). Moreover,
if we can demonstrate a distribution D s.t. the expected
contribution to the efficiency ofRma(k+m) from these extra
m bidders (bk+1, bk+2, ..bk+m), is strictly less than GainD,
i.e., if we show that GainD−LossD < 0, for some k, l, (and
that there is no additional gain to Rma(k +m) in the case
when one of the first k bidders has value equal to or greater
than rD), then we would have shown that m extra bidders
does not suffice.
Therefore, we examine this key expressionGainD−LossD
in the next section. We will omit the subscript D whenever
it is clear from the context.
3.1 The expression Gain− Loss
Recall the expressions GainD and LossD as defined in
Equations 2 and 1.
For the purpose of getting a better handle on the expres-
sion Gain− Loss, we will partition the set of all MHR dis-
tributions into different classes, according to their optimal
reserve price r and the value of the cdf at the optimal reserve
price, as follows. Let D(r, φ) be the set of MHR distributions
with a fixed reserve price r ≥ 0 and F (r) = φ. Note that,
by Lemma 1, D(r, φ) is non-empty only if φ ∈ [0, 1 − 1/e].
Also note that all these distributions have the same value
for the expression Gain and differ only in the numerator of
the expression Loss.
Next, we find a distribution in D(r, φ) which maximizes
the numerator of Loss.
Definition 2 (Distribution Gφ,r). Let r ≥ 0, φ ∈
[0, 1− 1/e], and let t(φ, r) = r(1+ ln(1−φ)) ∈ [0, r]. Then,
Gφ,r(x) =
8>><
>>:
0 0 ≤ x < t(φ, r),
1 − e−
1
r
(x−t(φ,r)) t(φ, r) ≤ x ≤ r,
φ+ 1−φ
ǫ
.(x− r) r ≤ x ≤ r + ǫ,
1 x ≥ r + ǫ.
Here ǫ is any positive number. It can be verified that the
above distribution has the following properties:
• Gφ,r is MHR.
• The optimal reserve price for Gφ,r is r.
• Gφ,r(r) = φ. Therefore, Gφ,r ∈ D(r, φ).
Next, we prove that Gφ,r is (point-wise) no larger than
every other function in D(r, φ)
Lemma 2. For every distribution D ∈ D(r, φ), and any
y ∈ [0, r]:
FD(y) ≥ Gφ,r(y)
Proof. The cdf of a distribution D with hazard rate
hD(.) can be written as FD(y) = 1− e
−
R y
0 hD(z)dz.
Now, by definition, r − 1
hD(r)
= 0, implying hD(r) = 1/r.
Since hD(.) is an increasing function, therefore hD(z) ≤ 1/r
for all z ≤ r. Also note that hGφ,r (z) = 0 for z < t(φ, r),
and hGφ,r (z) = 1/r for z ∈ [t(φ, r), r].
Thus, for any y ∈ [t(φ, r), r] we have
Z r
y
hD(z)dz ≤
Z r
y
hGφ,r (z)dz
⇒
Z r
0
hD(z)dz −
Z y
0
hD(z)dz
≤
Z r
0
hGφ,r (z)dz −
Z y
0
hGφ,r (z)dz
Since FD(r) = Gφ,r(r) = φ, (and recalling from the defi-
nition of hazard rate that FD(x) = 1 − e
−
R
x
0 hD(t)dt for all
distributions D) we have
R r
0
hD(z)dz =R r
0
hGφ,r (z)dz. Therefore,
−
Z y
0
hD(z)dz ≤ −
Z y
0
hGφ,r (z)dz
⇒ 1− e−
R y
0 hD(z)dz ≥ 1− e
−
R y
0 hGφ,r
(z)dz
Thus, for any y ∈ [t(φ, r), r], FD(y) ≥ Gφ,r(y). Since
Gφ,r(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, t(φ, r)), we have proved the lemma.
Next we prove that the numerator of Loss among D(r, φ)
is maximized at Gφ,r.
Lemma 3. For every distribution D ∈ D(r, φ):Z r
0
xf
(k)
D (x)dx ≤
Z r
0
x[G
(k)
φ,r(x)]
′dx
Proof. For any D ∈ D(r, φ), we haveZ r
0
xf
(k)
D (x)dx = rF
(k)
D (r)−
Z r
0
F
(k)
D (x)dx
(integrating by parts)
≤ rG
(k)
φ,r(r)−
Z r
0
G
(k)
φ,r(x)dx
=
Z r
0
x[G
(k)
φ,r(x)]
′dx
The inequality follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that
rF
(k)
D (r) = rG
(k)
φ,r(r) = rφ
k.
Now that we know that, among all distributions inD(r, φ),
Gφ,r maximizes the expression Loss, we can calculate the
maximum value of Loss in terms of r and φ. Lemma 6
examines the numerator of Loss at Gφ,r.
Fact 4. For a fixed λ, t, and k:
R
(1 − e−λ(x−t))kdx =
x− 1
λ
Pk
i=1
(1−e−λ(x−t))i
i
Proof. Let gk =
R
(1− e−λ(x−t))kdx. We have
gk =
Z
(1− e−λ(x−t))k−1dx
−
Z
e−λ(x−t)(1− e−λ(x−t))k−1dx
⇒ gk = gk−1 −
1
λ.k
(1− e−λ(x−t))k
⇒ gk = g0 −
1
λ
kX
i=1
(1− e−λ(x−t))i
i
⇒ gk = x−
1
λ
kX
i=1
(1− e−λ(x−t))i
i
Corollary 5. For a fixed r, t and k,R r
t
(1− e−
x−t
r )kdx = r − t− r
Pk
i=1
φi
i
, where
φ = 1− e−
r−t
r .
Lemma 6.
R r
0
x[G
(k)
φ,r(x)]
′dx
= r
“
φk + ln(1− φ) +
Pk
i=1
φi
i
”
Proof. Integrating by parts, we haveZ r
0
x[G
(k)
φ,r(x)]
′dx = rφk −
Z r
0
G
(k)
φ,r(x)dx
= rφk −
Z r
t(φ,r)
(1 − e−
1
r
(x−t(φ,r)))kdx
= rφk −
"
r − t(φ, r)− r
kX
i=1
φi
i
#
(by Corollary 5)
= rφk + r(1 + ln(1− φ))− r + r
kX
i=1
φi
i
(by definition of t(φ, r))
= r
 
φk + ln(1− φ) +
kX
i=1
φi
i
!
Let D ∈ D(r, φ). Then, for any given m, from equations 2
and 1 and Lemma 6, we have:
GainD − LossD
≥ GainGφ,r − LossGφ,r
= (1− φm)r −
r
“
φk + ln(1− φ) +
Pk
i=1
φi
i
”
φk
=
r
“
−(φ)k+m − ln(1− φ)−
Pk
i=1
φi
i
”
φk
(3)
3.2 Upper bound on the number of extra bid-
ders required
To prove an upper bound for distributions in D(r, φ), we
need to find values of m (as a function of k) for which the
expression in Equation 3 is non-negative. To do this, we
define a uni-variate polynomial
q(x) := xk+m + ln(1− x) +
kX
i=1
xi
i
Since φ ∈ [0, 1 − 1/e] by Lemma 1, it suffices to find m for
which q(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1− 1/e].
Since q(0) = 0, if we find values of m for which q′(x) ≤
0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1− 1/e], then q(x) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1− 1/e]. Now,
q′(x) = (k +m)xk+m−1 −
1
1− x
+
kX
i=1
xi−1
= (k +m)xk+m−1 −
1
1− x
+
1− xk
1− x
= (k +m)xk+m−1 −
xk
1− x
=
xk
1− x
((k +m)xm−1(1− x)− 1)
Since x
k
1−x
≥ 0, q′(x) ≤ 0 iff xm−1(1−x) ≤ 1
k+m
. It is easy
to see that, for x ∈ [0, 1−1/e], xm−1(1−x) is maximized at
x = 1− 1/e for m > 2. Let c = e
e−1
, and m = logc(2k) + 2.
For this choice of m,
xm−1(1− x)−
1
k +m
≤
1
clogc(2k)+1
1
e
−
1
k + logc(2k) + 2
which can be seen to be non-positive for all k. This proves
the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Given any D and k, let m = log e
e−1
(2k)+2 ≃
log k
log e
e−1
+ 3.5. Then,
GainD − LossD ≥ 0
Thus, we have established the following theorem.
Theorem 8 (One-item Upper Bound). For the case
of selling one item, we have
Eff(Rma(k +m)) ≥ Eff(Ema(k))
for any k and m ≥
j
log 1
α
2k
k
+ 2, where α = 1 − 1/e.
Thus, O(log k) extra bidders suffice for the revenue maxi-
mizing mechanism to achieve at least as much efficiency as
the efficiency maximizing mechanism with k bidders.
3.3 Lower bound on the number of extra bid-
ders required
In this section, we will prove a lower bound on the num-
ber of extra bidders m needed for the revenue maximizing
mechanism to achieve at least as much efficiency as the ef-
ficiency maximizing mechanism with k bidders. To prove
such a lower bound, it suffices to specify a distribution D
s.t. the contribution of the m extra bidders to expected effi-
ciency of Rma(k+m) is no more than Gain and show that
Gain− Loss < 0 for this choice of k and m.
Consider the distribution Gφ,r for any choice of r, φ (see
definition 2), and arbitrarily small ǫ. We first show that for
the distribution specified by Gφ,r(x), the contribution of m
extra bidders to the efficiency of Rma(k +m) is arbitrarily
close to GainGφ,r . To see this, note that the maximum
value possible under distribution Gφ,r(x) is r + ǫ; thus, the
maximum possible efficiency for any draw of bidder values
is r + ǫ. When all the first k bidders draw a value below r,
the m extra bidders contribute a maximum of r + ǫ to the
efficiency of Rma(k+m) with probability equal to (1−Gmφ,r).
Thus, the total contribution of the m extra bidders to the
efficiency of Rma(k +m) is arbitrarily close to r(1−Gmφ,r),
which is the same as Gain.
Let α = 1− 1/e. Let m(k) =
j
log1/α (k + 1)(1− α)
k
+ 1.
Next we’ll show that GainGφ,r − LossGφ,r < 0 for some
choice of φ, any k and for all m ≤ m(k). To do this, recall
the polynomial q(x) = xk+m + ln(1 − x) +
Pk
i=1
xi
i
. By
Equation 3, we know that GainGφ,r − LossGφ,r =
−rq(φ)
φk
.
Therefore, we just need to show that q(x) > 0 for the above
choice of m and some x (we will choose φ to be that x).
q(α) = αk+m(k) + ln(1− α) +
kX
i=1
αi
i
= αk+m(k) −
∞X
i=1
αi
i
+
kX
i=1
αi
i
= αk+m(k) −
∞X
i=k+1
αi
i
> αk+m(k) −
1
k + 1
∞X
i=k+1
αi
= αk+m(k) −
αk+1
(k + 1)(1− α)
≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the choice of m.
This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (One-item Lower Bound). Let α = 1−
1/e and let m(k) =
j
log1/α (k + 1)(1− α)
k
+ 1. Then, if
bidders are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution described by
Gα,r, Eff(Rma(k +m)) < Eff(Ema(k)) for any r, any k
and any m ≤ m(k). In other words, m(k) extra bidders do
not suffice for the revenue maximizing mechanism to achieve
as much efficiency as the efficiency maximizing mechanism
with k bidders.
Note that m(k) ≃ log k+1
log e
e−1
− 2.2, which differs from the
upper bound only by a small additive constant, namely 5.7.
4. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE ITEMS
In this section we consider the case of selling t identical
items. As before, the efficiency maximizing mechanism gets
k bidders, and we want to find the smallest number of extra
bidders that suffice for the revenue maximizing auction to
make as much efficiency. As seen in the previous section,
m = m(k) =
j
log 1
α
2k
k
+ 2 suffice when selling only one
item. So clearly, mt extra bidders would suffice in the case
of t identical items. However, as we show below, it is possible
to prove a much tighter bound.
The question is to find the smallest number s = s(k) such
that the efficiency of the revenue maximizing mechanism
with k+m+ s bidders, Rma(k+m+ s), is at least as much
as the efficiency of the efficiency maximizing mechanism on
k bidders, Ema(k), where m = m(k). As before, to compare
the two mechanisms with different number of bidders, we
will think of the process of drawing the values of k +m+ s
bidders (b1, b2, ..bk+m+s) independently from the given dis-
tribution D; the first k bidders (b1, b2, ..bk) participate in
both Rma(k +m+ s) and Ema(k), whereas the last m + s
bidders participate only in Rma(k +m+ s).
We partition the space of draws of bidder values into k+1
parts: For i = 0, ..., k, the ith part, Ωi, consists of those
draws in which exactly i of the first k bidders have values
greater than rD. We now focus on one of these parts, say,
the ith part Ωi, and try to determine the expected efficiency
of Ema(k) and Rma(k +m + s) over this restricted space.
Wlog, we may assume that i < t (if i ≥ t, then the efficiency
of Rma(k) is already equal to that of Ema(k)). We define
t′ = t− i and k′ = k − i.
Let (bmax1 , bmax2 , · · · , bmaxk) be the bids of first k bidders
in the decreasing order of their value. Also let Γi denote the
sum of the highest i of these bids, conditioned on being in
Ωi.
The expected efficiency of Ema(k) conditioned on being
in Ωi, Eff(Ema
i(k)), equals
= E[
iX
j=1
bmaxj | Ωi] + E[
kX
j=i+1
bmaxj | Ωi]
≤ Γi + t
′E[bmaxi+1 | Ωi]
Now,
E[bmaxi+1 | Ωi] =
E[max(bi+1, bi+2, · · · , bk) | b1..bi ≥ r & bi+1..bk < r]
(because of the symmetry)
= E[max(bi+1, bi+2, · · · , bk) | bi+1..bk < r]
(since b′js are independent)
=
R r
0
xf (k
′)(x)dx
F k′(r)
Therefore,
Eff(Emai(k)) ≤ Γi + t
′
R r
0
xf (k
′)(x)dx
F k′(r)
(4)
Conditioned on being in Ωi, the contribution to the ex-
pected efficiency of Rma(k + m + s) from the first k bid-
ders is Γi. The contribution to the expected efficiency of
Rma(k+m+ s) from the remaining m+ s bidders depends
on how many of the extra bidders have value above r. If j of
these bidders have value more than r, then the contribution
is at least min(j, t′)r. We have the following lower bound on
this contribution (note that the contribution from the extra
m+s bidders is independent of the first k bidders, and hence
of Ωi):
Lemma 10. For any ǫ > 0, and for large enough m, if
s ≥ (t+ (1 + ǫ)t logm), then the total contribution to the
efficiency of Rma(k + m + s) from the remaining m + s
bidders is at least rt′(1− Fm(r)).
Proof. Recall that φ = F (r). Let aj =
`
m+s
j
´
φm+s−j(1−
φ)j . The contribution is:
r
2
4t′−1X
j=0
jaj + (1−
t′−1X
j=1
aj)t
′
3
5
= r
2
4t′ − t
′
−1X
j=0
aj(t
′ − j)
3
5
But,
aj(t
′ − j) ≤
(m+ s)j
j!
φmφs−j(1− φ)j(t′ − j)
≤ φm(m+ s)j(1− 1/e)s(t′ − j)
≤ φm
for s ≥ (t+ (1 + ǫ)t logm) + log t and any ǫ > 0 and large
enough m. Thus the contribution is at least rt′(1−φm).
Let m = loge/(e−1)(2k) + 2. Then, using Lemma 10 and
the discussion above, the efficiency of Rma conditioned on
being in Ωi is:
Eff(Rmai(k +m+ s)) ≥ Γi + t
′(1− F (r)m)r
≥ Γi + t
′
R r
0
xf (k
′)(x)dx
F k′(r)
(by Lemma 7, and since k′ ≤ k)
≥ Eff(Emai(k))
(by equation (4))
Thus we have proved the following theorem (we have not
tried to optimize the constants or how large k has to be for
this result to hold).
Theorem 11 (Multi-item Upper Bound). In the case
of selling t identical items, we have
Eff(Rma(k +m+ s)) ≥ Eff(Ema(k))
for m ≥
j
log 1
α
2k
k
+2 and s ≥ (t+ (1 + ǫ)t logm), for every
ǫ > 0 and large enough k. Thus, approximately, log k +
t log log k extra bidders suffice.
5. THE CASE OF REGULAR DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we will show that for any given k and m,
there exists a regular distribution D s.t. expected efficiency
of Rma(k+m) is less than the expected efficiency of Ema(k).
To recall, a distribution D is regular if and only if the
function ψ(x) := x − 1
hD(x)
is non decreasing in x. Now
consider the following distribution:
Pǫ,r(x) :=
(
1− ǫ
x+ǫ
0 ≤ x < r,
1 x ≥ r
One can easily verify that the above distribution is reg-
ular for every choice of ǫ, r > 0, by evaluating its ψ func-
tion. Moreover the reserve price of this distribution equals
r. Now, using similar arguments as used in the previous
sections, we can show that the contribution of the extra
m bidders to Eff[Rma(k + m)] is r(1 − (1 − ǫ
r+ǫ
)m)(1 −
ǫ
r+ǫ
)k ≤ r(1− (1− ǫ
r+ǫ
)m). Also, the extra contribution of
the first k bidders to Eff[Ema(k)] over Eff[Rma(k + m)]
when all of the first k bidders have a value below reserve
price r is
R r
0
x[P kǫ,r(x)]
′dx.
Now, as we decrease the value ǫ, the term r(1−(1− ǫ
r+ǫ
)m)
decreases and
R r
0
x[P kǫ,r(x)]
′dx increases for a fixed k and m.
Moreover, one can show that there exists a small enough ǫ :=
ǫ′ such that
R r
0
x[P kǫ′,r(x)]
′dx is more than r(1−(1− ǫ
′
r+ǫ′
)m).
Thus, for the distribution Pǫ′,r , the loss in Eff[Rma(k+m)]
because of the reserve price is more than the gain from extra
m bidders.
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